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Abstract
The Chapter discusses the role played by labor market in-
stitutions in shaping the dynamics of wages, employment, and
unemployment across European countries and the United States.
The rst part of the Chapter uses simple, but formal models to
show that the greater job security granted to European employ-
ees should smooth out aggregate employment dynamics but, for
given wage processes, cannot be expected to reduce aggregate em-
ployment. Slow employment creation and high, persistent unem-
ployment are associated with high and increasing wages in cross-
country evidence, and the Chapter surveys recent work aimed at
explaining such dierential wage dynamics via insider-outsider in-
teractions and wage bargaining institutions. The following Section
discusses the extent to which job security provisions and wage-
setting practices can rationalize evidence on cross-sectional job
turnover and wage inequality, and reviews the implications of such
phenomena for aggregate labor markets' productivity. The chap-
ter is concluded by a discussion of recent perspectives on the pos-
sible determinants (rather than the eects) of institutional labor
market dierences across industrialized countries and over time.

For Handbook of Labor Economics Vol 3. This paper benets from comments
received at the Handbook Conference, at a seminar presentation in Bologna, and
from Joergen Elmeskov. The author's work receives nancial support from C.N.R.,
M.U.R.S.T. \gia60%," and the Research Council of the European University Institute.
1 Introduction
Job security provisions and wage-setting institutions constrain microeco-
nomic employment relationships in widely dierent ways across labor
markets and over time. Since the previous volumes of this Handbook
were published, theoretical and empirical work has identied meaning-
ful causal linkages between such institutional dierences and the equally
wide ranges of aggregate labor market outcomes, particularly with re-
spect to the extent and character of unemployment and of wage inequal-
ity.
This Chapter oers a critical review of selected theoretical insights
on the interaction of labor demand, wage determination, and institu-
tional settings. Blau and Kahn (this volume) discuss in detail a wide
range of institutional factors in labor market outcomes; a stylized and
streamlined view of institutions is adopted here, and issues central to
more empirically-oriented surveys such as those by Bean (1994), Machin
and Manning (this volume), and Nickell and Layard (this volume) are
discussed in simple formal settings without aiming to assess the empir-
ical relevance of an exhaustive menu of macroeconomic unemployment
theories.
It will be helpful, however, to review recent theoretical develop-
ments against the background of simple pieces of comparative evidence.
Since the contrast of European and U.S. labor markets performance at
the aggregate level motivates the work reviewed below and inspires its
theoretical perspective, all Figures and Tables of the chapter refer to
just ve countries|the U.S., and the largest four European countries.
Figure 1 plots real wages and total employment: it is quite tempting
to view the plot of European real wage and employment trends normal-
ized by their U.S. counterparts (shown in the last panel of Figure 1) as
a sample of observations around an aggregate labor demand schedule.
More generally, nding that low employment is associated with high real
1
wages may encourage researchers to adopt the microeconomic perspec-
tive of partial-equilibrium labor-demand diagrams as a starting point for
an interpretation of aggregate labor market performance.
[ Figure 1]
In many respects, of course, it is far from fully appropriate to pur-
sue such a simple microeconomic interpretation of aggregate facts. Part
of the stronger U.S. employment performance reects the considerably
faster growth of population and labor force in the U.S. than in European
countries. As Figure 2 shows, however, trend dierences in employment
rates are, if anything, even more pronounced than those displayed by
employment indexes (and the same is true of the unemployment rates
shown in Figure 5 below). Even when appropriately qualied, the sim-
ple message of the Figures remains powerful enough to warrant frequent
references to wage exibility in policy-oriented analyses, such as OECD
(1994, p.22), and to motivate an extensive strand of theoretical and em-
pirical work.
[ Figure 2]
1.1 Scope of the survey
Evidence of a negative correlation between wage and employment growth
across countries begs the question of which institutional dierences in the
relevant labor markets may be responsible for the joint determination
of wages and employment trends. The microeconomic approaches to
aggregate phenomena reviewed below aim at explaining how interactions
of labor demand uctuations and wage determination shape labor market
outcomes, focusing especially on reasons why the latter may dier widely
across labor markets with dierent institutions. Interest in this wide
issue runs across several interrelated strands of literature, which oer a
variety of complementary theoretical insights and are typically motivated
by pieces of comparative evidence such as that shown by Figure 1, and
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by more subtle features exemplied for the same ve countries|and in
the same simple-minded way|by other Figures and Tables below.
Like all surveys, the present one must be incomplete. Its partial-
equilibrium perspective on wage and employment dynamics is narrowly
focused on the interaction of labor demand and wage determination, and
relies heavily on simplifying assumptions at both the macroeconomic and
microeconomic ends of the labor-market-phenomena spectrum.
The time-series behavior of such macroeconomic factors as aggre-
gate demand, energy prices, or productivity dynamics is obviously quite
dierent across countries. In particular, the evidence in Ball (1997) indi-
cates that monetary policy and disination have signicant explanatory
power for comparative unemployment dynamics across European coun-
tries. The forcing processes of labor demand, however, are assigned a
background role by the theoretical models reviewed in this chapter. This
approach makes it easier to obtain intuition and insight from uncluttered
theoretical models, and may well entail little loss of information in com-
parative work if the stochastic properties (as opposed to the realization)
of labor demand shocks are similar across the economies considered and
general equilibrium eects spill across them through integrated markets
for goods and nancial instruments. To further simplify exposition, the
chapter's simple partial-equilibrium analytical models do not explicitly
acknowledge that the costs of labor turnover and worker mobility gener-
ally depend not only on labor market institutions but also, endogenously,
on aggregate labor market outcomes. Most importantly, mobility costs
and wage determination are jointly endogenous in the models surveyed
by Mortensen and Pissarides (this volume), where labor mobility entails
a slow and costly matching process vacancies to workers.
1
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The models of Acemoglu (1995), Millard and Mortensens (1997), Lijunqvist
(1997), and Lijunqvist and Sargent (1995) pay particular attention, in a search and
matching context, to some of the institutional features on which the present survey
is focused.
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The aggregate viewpoint of the literature reviewed below also relies
on stylized specications of microeconomic labor-market interactions. To
focus on labor demand as an exogenous determinant of employment and
wage dynamics, the theoretical perspective of this Chapter and of the
literature it reviews treats labor as an homogeneous factor. In reality, of
course, an individual worker's wage and employment status may relate to
his own age, experience, education, and other personal characteristics in
ways that do depend on institutional dierences across countries and la-
bor markets with respect to the responsiveness of wages and employment
to individual characteristics rather than to aggregate and disaggregated
labor demand dynamics. A fully worked out microeconomic model would
allow individual workers' characteristics and eort to bear on their labor
market experience, and these aspects could generally be very relevant to
aggregate labor market performance.
2
1.2 Outline
To pinpoint the determinants of dierential wage growth and analyze its
employment eects, theoretical models use more rened tools than static
textbook diagrams. Sections 2 and 3 below focuses on the dynamics of
labor demand and wages, each of which is arguably inuenced by such
institutional dierences across labor markets as the stringency of job
security provisions on labor demand, and the bargaining strength and
coverage of unions in the wage-setting process.
2
In particular, the extent and character of equilibrium unemployment implied by
eciency-wage considerations is not independent of labor market institutions. On the
one hand, the threat of dismissal may much more eectively deter shirking when re-
employment probabilities are as low as in rigid labor markets, where unemployment is
predominantly long-term. On the other hand, dismissal is likely to be a less eective
threat when rules and regulations intended to protect employees from labor-demand
uctuations and wrongful dismissals increase the complexity and cost of ring pro-
cedures motivated by worker behavior. Saint-Paul (1995a,1997a) and Fella (1997)
discuss interactions between eciency wages and labor market dynamics.
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Since job creation and destruction occur simultaneouslywithinmea-
sured aggregates, it is not necessarily appropriate to cast partial-equilibrium
models of aggregate employment and wages in terms of \representative"
rms and workers. The work reviewed in Section 4 recognizes that idio-
syncratic employment uctuations interact importantly with aggregate
labor market developments, and that institutional dierences across la-
bor markets can importantly aect aggregate developments though their
eects on idiosyncratic employment dynamics. Hiring and ring coexist
in reality, and Section 4.1 discusses how turnover costs may determine
the intensity of job turnover; wage dynamics are also less than adequately
summarized by aggregate series: Section 4.2 discusses empirical evidence
on (and institutional explanations for) comparative wage inequality lev-
els and trends across aggregate labor markets, focusing in particular on
how centralized contracts, minimum wages, and unemployment insur-
ance bear on the responsiveness of wages and/or employment to labor
demand shocks at the level of rms or establishments.
To the extent that the literature reviewed in Sections 2-4 improves
our understanding of the economic mechanisms by which institutional
details aect aggregate labor market outcomes, it also throws some light
on the more dicult question of which deeper economic and political
features might in turn determine institutional dierences across coun-
tries and over time. Such politico-economic aspects are most relevant
as European countries undertake reform of their poorly performing la-
bor markets. Section 5 briey reviews recent contributions on the role
of distributional tensions and market imperfections in the endogenous
formation of labor markets' institutional structure.
The Chapter's train of thought and tentative conclusions are per-
haps better summarized here than at the end. Job security provisions
have certainly played an important role in shaping aggregate employment
dynamics across countries. Both theory and empirical evidence, however,
indicate that high ring costs can explain low employment variability but
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cannot, in isolation, rationalize the dismal employment performance of
many European countries, which appears to be associated with high wage
growth as well as with job security. High and increasing wages, in turn,
are explained by the protection aorded to the currently employed \in-
siders" by wage compression as well as by job security provisions per se.
These two institutional features are obviously complementary to each
other in making it dicult or impossible for the unemployed to bid for
jobs|and, since prime-age males are as likely to be employed in Eu-
ropean countries as in the U.S., it is not surprising to nd that high
labor market rigidity has displayed remarkable politico-economic stabil-
ity through much of the last two decades.
2 Job security and ring costs
The character and stringency of legal provisions regarding dismissal of
redundant employees dier widely across European and American labor
markets. In general, what is required is that job termination be moti-
vated, and that workers should be given reasonable notice or nancial
compensation in lieu of notice. In practice, enforcement of such laws
is based on the workers' right to appeal against termination. Hence,
employment reduction entails lengthy negotiations with workers' organi-
zations and/or legal procedures.
The stringency of such job-security provisions does vary across la-
bor markets, and over time as well. Even in the relatively unregulated
U.S. labor market, experience-rated unemployment insurance contribu-
tions make it costly at the margin for rms to reduce employment (Card
and Levine, 1994; Anderson, 1993), and redundancy costs also arise from
theWorker Adjustment and Retraining Notication Act (WARN) of 1988
requiring covered rms to provide employees with 60 days' advance no-
tice of plant closures and large-scale layos.
3
Most European countries
3
Also, rules regarding dismissal of individual employees can interfere with rms'
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feature similar, but more stringent regulation of individual and collective
dismissals. Some aspects of job-security provisions, such as the number
of months' notice required for individual and collective redundancies, are
readily quantied; Grubb and Wells (1993) compile and discuss the rele-
vant institutional information for a cross-section of industrial countries,
and Lazear (1990), Addison and Grosso (1996), and others also consider
such simple indicators' time-series behavior. Other important aspects of
job-security provisions, such as the willingness of labor courts to enter-
tain appeals by red workers and the interpretation placed by judges on
the rather vague notion of \just cause" for termination, are more di-
cult to quantify precisely. While this makes it hard to measure precisely
the stringency of ring constraints in each labor market, available indi-
cators of job security provisions|such as the length of notice periods,
the percentage of dismissals brought before labor courts, and the size of
redundancy payments|are positively correlated with each other. This
makes it possible to assess unambiguously (if only qualitatively) the rel-
ative stringency of job security constraints, and to correlate aspects of
labor market performance to the resulting overall \rigidity rank" rather
than to specic quantitative measures of rigidity or to their dynamic
behavior.
In this Chapter's gures and tables, country-specic information
is displayed or listed in the order of labor market regulation ranking
compiled from such qualitative classications. Unsurprisingly, Italy and
the U.S. are placed at the extreme ends of the rankings proposed, among
others, by Bertola (1990) and Grubb and Wells (1993).
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decisions to adjust overall employment levels. In unionized rms, contractual provi-
sions for inverse seniority makes it dicult to calibrate employment reduction (Piore,
1996); and there is empirical evidence that legal provisionsmeant to protect individual
employees become more binding during cyclical downturns (Donohue and Siegelman,
1995).
4
A qualitatively clear pattern can also be discerned along the time dimension.
In most European countries, job security provisions were tightened in the 1968-74
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2.1 Hiring and ring
To formalize a labor-demand approach to employment determination,
let the marginal productivity of labor employed by a typical rm be a
function (l
t
; Z
t
) which is decreasing on the amount l
t
of (homogeneous)
labor employed at time t, and also depends on an exogenous shifter Z
representing all possible determinants of labor demand.
As is well known from the contributions reviewed by Nickell (1986),
when hiring and/or ring is costly the rm's employment policy should
take into account labor's marginal contribution to expected present dis-
counted prots,
V (l
t
; Z
t
; :::) = E
t
"
T
X
=t

1
1 + r

 t

1
1 + 

 t
((l

; Z

)  w

)
#
; (1)
rather than on current conditions only. The shadow value V () evaluates
the expected change in future prots caused by a feasible marginal vari-
ation of the current and all future employment levels, leaving all future
hiring and ring decisions unchanged (as is appropriate since, if such
decisions are optimal, innitesimal variations would have no eect on
prots by the envelope theorem). In equation (1), r represents the dis-
count rate applied to future cash ows, and  represents the spontaneous
(and costless) attrition of additional employment through quits and re-
tirements; both are supposed constant for simplicity but, of course, may
period of union militancy. The timing of such reforms coincided with increasing
unemployment but, of course, other simultaneous developments in, e.g., the price of
oil, union militancy, and scal and monetary policy make it dicult to formulate
causal interpretations. In fact, empirical work by Lazear (1990) and Addison and
Grosso (1996) oers a contradictory and weak pattern of results. Over the late 1980s
and 1990s, tentative steps towards labor market deregulation were taken by many of
the same countries. Section 5.3 below briey discusses such time-series developments.
With the notable exception of the British labor market reform in the 1980s, however,
dynamic developments were not such as to alter the relative rankings of European
countries' labor market rigidity, and always kept their job security provisions much
more stringent than in the U.S.
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well vary over time in more realistic models. The expectation of current
and future marginal prots depends on the current employment level l
t
if
() is downward-sloping in employment, and on the current realization
of exogenous factors Z
t
if the process describing them is persistent. Past
realizations of Z and/or of other variables may also be arguments of V (),
depending on the processes followed by Z
t
and w
t
.
When turnover is costly, employers should compare the shadow
value V () of labor to hiring and ring costs. If H() denotes the mar-
ginal hiring cost, hiring additional employees increases the rm's value
if V ()  H(), while ring would be optimal if V () <  F () for F ()
the unit marginal cost of redundancy payments and other costs entailed
by dismissals. Both hiring and ring costs may depend on the size of
the relevant employment variation. In empirical specications, it is con-
venient to let marginal turnover costs be linear, with possibly dierent
slopes in the hiring and ring region (Pfann and Palm, 1993); Hamermesh
(1993) and Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) oer a synopsis of empirical
approaches and ndings. While increasing unit costs of hiring and ring
should induce employers to smooth out over time any desired employ-
ment variation, the infrequent and lumpy nature of employment changes
suggests that lump-sum turnover costs are also relevant in reality: if
total turnover costs feature a xed component besides the integral of
the marginal functionsH(), F (), then the employment decisions should
consider nitely-sized employment variations, which will indeed be opti-
mal over the region where per-unit average turnover costs are declining
in turnover.
Since theoretical considerations might lead one to specify unit ad-
justment costs as an increasing or decreasing function of total turnover,
a linear specication oers a useful baseline case of some generality. For
theoretical purposes, it is often simplest and insightful to let unit turnover
costs be constant, i.e., to assume that employers pay a constant amount
H per worker hired, and a ring cost F per unit of employment re-
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duction relative to the previous period, so that adjustment costs are a
piecewise linear function of total turnover. Dierent job-security insti-
tutions across labor markets may be represented by dierent cost slopes
for positive and negative employment changes (H 6= F ). Then, vary-
ing F while keeping H constant oers useful insights into the theoretical
eects of dierent job-security provisions across economies whose techno-
logical requirements are similar enough to let the same cost H represent
non-institutional costs of hiring workers and setting up jobs.
The dynamic behavior of the labor demand shifter Z can also be
specied in a variety of ways, striving for a balance of quantitative re-
alism and analytical tractability. Bentolila and Bertola (1990) let Z be
described by a persistent process in continuous time (Brownian motion).
Like other work on real choices under uncertainty reviewed by Dixit and
Pindyck (1994), the resulting model of labor demand can exploit tech-
nical tools and option-pricing analogies from the nancial literature. If
ring and hiring entail rst-order unit costs, the rm should allow the ra-
tio of wages to labor's marginal product to uctuate within an \inaction
range" whose width importantly depends on the degree of uncertainty
about the future. The same intuitive and arguably realistic characteriza-
tion of employment dynamics obtains in dierent formalizations. Mon-
tias (1991) explores the implications of prohibitive ring costs in the
presence of stationary price uncertainty, and Bentolila and Saint-Paul
(1994) model uncertainty in terms of uniformly and independently dis-
tributed random variables; among others, Bertola (1990), Bentolila and
Saint-Paul (1992), Cabrales and Hopenhayn (1997), study discrete- and
continuous-time models where forcing variables are described by persis-
tent Markov chains.
Each of these contributions makes these and other formal assump-
tions in order to address specic institutional and economic issues. Here,
it will be useful to outline briey but formally the basic insights aorded
by such models, letting the labor-demand forcing process follow simple
10
Markov chains and taking the wage w
t
to be constant in the face of labor
demand uctuations.
The latter assumption may not be inappropriate if the model's rm
is viewed as an aggregate labor market's representative employer.
[ Figure 3]
As shown in Figure 3, in fact, the cyclical behavior of wages and
employment is not nearly as consistent with a textbook labor demand re-
lationship as in the long-run, cross-country evidence displayed in Figure
1. In all countries considered, wages and employment are uncorrelated
at cyclical frequencies, consistently with evidence on the cyclical behav-
ior of wages, recently surveyed by Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) and
by Brandolini (1995), which is at best inconclusive in all countries.
5
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roughly acyclical real wage can be consistent with a variety of model,
including dynamic variants of the textbook competitive market clearing
scheme. It is also, and most relevantly to the narrow theoretical per-
spective of this Section, consistent with institutional arrangements that
prevent wages from responding to cyclical developments.
2.1.1 Inaction and endogenous employment persistence.
Consider rst optimal labor demand policies when the shifter Z
t
is inde-
pendently drawn each period from a three-point distribution fZ
B
; Z
M
; Z
G
g,
with Z
B
< Z
M
< Z
G
. For concreteness, let () be increasing in Z, so
that the prot-maximizing employment level at given wages is higher
when Z is. In the absence of turnover costs, the optimal employment
levels fL
B
; L
M
; L
G
g should be such as to equate labor's marginal pro-
5
For more extensive analyses of cyclical and trend relationships between wages,
employment, and unemployment, see Elmeskov and Pichelmann (1993), who nd
evidence of cyclical covariation among these series in Japanese and Swiss data. This
can be rationalized by institutional peculiarities of these labor markets, neglected here
for reasons of space.
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ductivity to the (constant) wage in each state,
(L
i
; Z
i
) = w; i = B;M;G; (2)
hence would also follow a stochastic process with independent and identi-
cally distributed realizations. This is the simplest among models where,
like in the more sophisticated and realistic ones cited above, turnover
costs may imply that the rm should not react to certain labor demand
shocks.
In this and other models where the current realizations of Z
t
and L
t
are sucient statistics for the conditional expectations featured in (1),
the denition the shadow value of labor implies the recursive relationship
V (l
t
; Z
t
) = (l
t
; Z
t
)   w + E
t
[V (l
t+1
; Z
t+1
)] : (3)
In general, inaction is optimal if the marginal productivity uctuations
associated with transitions between two values of Z
t
at unchanged em-
ployment are not so large as to result in a shadow value of labor smaller
than  F , or larger than H .
To formalize the notion of optimal inaction in the simplest possi-
ble dynamic setting, let the three possible values be realized with equal
probability in each period, let the labor attrition rate  be equal to zero,
and suppose parameters are such that the rm chooses to leave employ-
ment unchanged when Z
t
uctuates between the two smallest or the two
largest values of Z
t
, but does act when it experiences larger uctuations
between Z
B
and Z
G
.
6
The process driving employment then takes not
three, but only two values, i.e., the employment levels resulting from opti-
mal hiring and ring upon extreme labor-demand uctuations. Denoting
6
If not even the largest possible demand uctuations induced hiring or ring by
the rm, then employment would forever be constant at a level determined by initial
conditions. Such hysteresis would prevent a fully endogenous characterization of em-
ployment dynamics. Also, perpetual inaction in the face of exogenous shocks could
never be optimal if the employment attrition rate were positive ( > 0).
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these employment levels with L
B
and L
G
, the rm's dynamic optimality
condition has the form
H = (L
G
; Z
G
)  w +
1
1 + r
H   F + V
(M;G)
3
at times when Z
t
= Z
G
and the rm equates the marginal cost H of
hiring an additional unit of labor to its shadow value; optimality similarly
requires that
 F = (L
B
; Z
B
)  w +
1
1 + r
H   F + V
(M;B)
3
at times when Z
t
= Z
B
, and the marginal value change entailed by
decreasing employment below the optimal level L
B
compares unfavorably
to the marginal ring cost F . In each case, the shadow value of labor 1 is
written as the current marginal cash ow, (L
i
; Z
i
)  w (i = G;B), plus
the expected discounted value of the next period's shadow value, which
is again given by H or by  F in the two cases out of three in which
Z
t+1
again corresponds to the highest or the lowest of the three possible
values. When Z
t+1
= Z
M
and inaction is optimal, then the shadow value
of labor is V
(M;G)
and obeys the relationship
V
(M;G)
= (L
G
; Z
M
)  w +
1
1 + r
H   F + V
(M;G)
3
if the last action by the rm was an upward employment adjustment,
and
V
(M;B)
= (L
B
; Z
M
)  w +
1
1 + r
H   F + V
(M;B)
3
if it was a downward one. The dynamic optimality conditions form a
system of four equations in the four unknowns L
G
; L
B
; V
(M;G)
; V
(M;B)
;
inaction is indeed optimal if the solution is such that
 F < V
(M;B)
< H;  F < V
(M;G)
< H:
The resulting system of linear equations readily yields a closed-form solu-
tion if labor's marginal product takes (or is approximated by) the simple
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form
(L;Z) = Z   L:
In the simple example considered, the independently distributed forcing
variable Z
t
has no persistence across its three possible states. Yet, if
turnover costs are large enough to induce inaction (but not so large as
to prevent all action), then employment only takes the two values
L
B
=
1


Z
B
  w + F +
1
1 + r
Z
M
  Z
B
+H   2F
3

;
L
G
=
1


Z
G
  w  H +
1
1 + r
Z
M
  Z
G
+ 2H   F
3

;
and remains constant across two thirds of all pairs of consecutive periods.
Hence, employment follows a more persistent process than its forcing
variables. Similarly, but perhaps not as clearly, in the more sophisti-
cated models where Z
t
follows a Brownian motion with innite variation
turnover costs and optimal inaction yield an employment process of nite
variation.
2.1.2 The size of employment uctuations
Employment uctuations are not only less frequent, but also less pro-
nounced on average in the simple model above. This and other relevant
insights into the employment dynamics eects of adjustment costs can
be more immediately illustrated by an even simpler model where Z fea-
tures symmetric transition probabilities p across only two states Z
B
and
Z
G
> Z
B
. As long as p < 1=2, the process driving labor demand has
positive persistence, and the frequency of employment uctuations coin-
cides with that of exogenous shocks if turnover costs are not such as to
make perpetual inaction optimal.
Let the employment levels corresponding to Z
t
= Z
G
and Z
t
= Z
B
be l
G
and l
B
, respectively. If the interest rate is kept xed and labor
attrition is again disregarded for simplicity, then the expected present
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value of marginal revenue product minus the wage also follows a two-
state Markov process. Its values V
G
and V
B
at a good and a bad rm
satisfy the recursive relationships
V
G
= (l
G
; Z
G
)  w +
1
1 + r
[(1  p)V
G
+ pV
B
] (4)
V
B
= (l
B
; Z
B
)  w +
1
1 + r
[pV
G
+ (1  p)V
B
] : (5)
The expressions V
G
and V
B
for the shadow value of labor are a su-
cient statistic for a risk neutral employer's labor demand policy. At the
margin, a dynamic value-maximizing employment process again requires
that the shadow loss of net revenues from dismissing workers should
equal the actual cost of ring them (V
B
=  F ), and that V
G
should
equal the unit hiring cost. To highlight the implications of job security
provisions in the simplest possible setting|and with little loss of insight
if institutional dierences across labor markets pertain to legal job se-
curity regulations rather than to technological and contractual features
aecting rms' hiring costs|it is useful to disregard hiring costs: with
V
G
= 0, the equations in (5) can be solved to yield
(l
G
; Z
G
) = w +
p
1 + r
F; (6)
(l
B
; Z
B
) = w  
r + p
1 + r
F: (7)
Quite intuitively, concern about future ring costs induces the rm to
employ fewer units of labor when demand is strong. Labor's marginal
productivity should be equated not to the (constant) wage, but to the
wage plus the expected discounted value of unit ring costs to be paid
next period|i.e., the probability p of a downward uctuation of labor
demand, times the unit ring cost F discounted back from the following
period. Firing costs have an even more intuitive eect on ring decisions,
which are obviously less attractive when they entail immediate turnover
costs: if the probability p of an improvement in labor's marginal pro-
ductivity were zero, the rm would simply subtract the annuity value of
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turnover costs saved, rF=(1+ r), to the ow cost w of continued employ-
ment of the marginal worker; and labor hoarding behavior is all the more
attractive if p > 0, i.e., if there is a chance that the marginal worker may
contribute more than w to the rm's revenues in the following period.
The dierence of the two optimal marginal productivity levels from
(7),
(l
G
; Z
G
)  (l
B
; Z
B
) =
r + 2p
1 + r
F; (8)
is an increasing function of p: since wider uctuations of labor's mar-
ginal productivity are associated with narrower employment uctuations,
as in Figure 4, employment uctuations are less pronounced|for given
turnover costs|when uctuations of labor demand are more frequent.
[ Figure 4]
2.2 Dynamics and averages
As Figure 4 illustrates, ring costs stabilize employment in downturns
but also lead employers to refrain from hiring in upturns for a constant
(and any other given) cyclical wage pattern. As noted by Lazear (1990),
wages could potentially adjust to labor demand uctuations in such a
way as to oset the eects of (mandatory) redundancy payments. Side
payments and contractual agreements could also prevent deadweight reg-
ulations and payments to third parties from having any eect on wages
and employment. As shown in Figure 3, however, aggregate wages are
ambiguously related to employment uctuations in all countries consid-
ered, yet the cyclical volatility of employment is much more pronounced
in the United States and the United Kingdom than in Germany, Italy,
and especially France. Since the volatility of aggregate production is
rather similar across these and other industralized countries (see, e.g.,
Bertola and Ichino, 1995a), the stringency of job security provisions and
the resulting labor-hoarding are relevant to the evidence in Figures 1 and
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5: cyclical employment and unemployment uctuations are much wider
in the relatively less regulated labor markets of the U.S. (and of the
U.K. since Mrs Thatcher's reforms) than in the continental European
countries, and especially in France.
Other evidence also supports the relevance of job-security provi-
sions. To the extent that hiring and ring are inhibited by institutions,
employers have incentives to exploit other sources of (costly) exibility,
such as overtime: indeed, aggregate employment uctuations are rela-
tively subdued in Europe, but hours per worker are more variable there
(Abraham and Houseman, 1994). Also, unemployment is qualitatively
dierent in the U.S. and Europe. In European labor markets, a larger
percentage of the unemployed experiences long-term spells of joblessness,
many of the unemployed are young labor market entrants, and relatively
few are job losers. Dynamic labor demand models such as that outlined
above readily rationalize such cross-country patterns of evidence. To the
extent that ring costs prevent dissolution of existing employment re-
lationships, sharply rising unemployment is less likely in countries with
stringent job security provisions. As ring costs also reduce forward-
looking hiring decisions and job creation, employment increases are sim-
ilarly smoothed, and individuals who|like new entrants to the labor
market|happen to be unemployed at any given point in time are less
likely to exit into employment and more likely to experience long-term
unemployment.
7
If ring costs do have eects on aggregate employment's dynamic
behavior in real-life labor markets, the question arises of whether their
contrasting eects on hiring and ring work out to positive or negative
net eects on longer-run relationships between wage and employment
levels. The relevant predictions of dynamic labor demand models are
7
As argued by Davis and Henrekson (1997) with reference to Swedish and Ameri-
can evidence, labor market institutions and other forms of regulation appear relevant
to a host of other empirical features in cross-country comparisons.
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simple: since higher turnover costs reduce both hiring and ring, their
eect on average employment levels over periods when both hiring and
ring occur is a order of magnitude lower than that on hiring and ring
separately.
The sign of the net employment eect of subdued hiring and r-
ing depends on such subtle features of formal models as the functional
form of labor demand functions, the persistence of labor demand uctu-
ations, and the size of discount and attrition rates.
8
The simple model
introduced above disregards labor attrition, but can usefully highlight
the other qualitative determinants of average-employment eects. Since
transitions from low to high labor demand and back have the same prob-
ability, in the long run the two states have equal probability; hence, the
average employment eect of turnover costs depends on the relative size
of the two horizontal arrows in Figure 4. In turn, the upward and down-
ward biases of labor demand at given wages reects the wedge placed by
F between w and (), on the vertical axis: the long-run average of such
wedges simply weights them equally and, from (7), amounts to
(l
G
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G
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  w =  
r
1 + r
F: (9)
As long as r > 0, labor's marginal productivity is biased above the wage
by ring costs in the long run. When choosing to refrain from ring, in
fact, employers contemplate the full, undiscounted ring cost F , while
reduced hiring only takes into account the present discounted value of
F . Hence, average employment is chosen as if wages were lower by the
annuity equivalent of the unit ring cost F .
9
The extent to which a
8
Such issues are studied in some detail by Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola
(1990, 1992), who nd that average employment eects are indeed small and of am-
biguous sign in reasonable parameterizations of dynamic labor-demand problems.
9
The eects of hiring costs are quite intuitively symmetric to those of ring costs.
In more complex modeling frameworks, labor demand shifters and employment take
a continuum of values and employment's endogenous and exogenous dynamics are
inuenced by labor attrition (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Bertola, 1992; Saint-Paul,
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downward bias in labor's marginal productivity is reected in an upward
employment bias, however, depends on the form of labor demand as
a function of employment and exogenous shifters. Referring again to
Figure 4, the relative size of the vertical arrows is reected back into the
horizontal axis according to the slopes of the two labor demand functions,
which in turn depend on the degree of convexity of labor demand with
respect to employment and on the eect of Z on the steepness of labor
demand. Hence, the net employment eect of F is generally small, and
is almost exactly zero if labor demand has constant slope and discount
factors over hiring/ring cycles are negligible.
In reality, rigid markets do tend to feature more stable employ-
ment and unemployment around levels which, in the long run, are not as
clearly correlated to the stringency of job security provisions as might be
expected. In Figure 5, European unemployment series are closely related
to increasing wage trends, but their average long-run level is much less
clearly related to their ranking in job-security terms.
10
However, only the low unemployment rates of the 1960s makes Eu-
ropean countries' long-run average unemployment comparable to U.S.
ones, and the extent and character of labor market rigidity is empirically
related to increasing unemployment and wages during the 1970s and
1980s (see Scarpetta, 1996, for a careful attempt at disentangling the
eects of various labor market institutions on unemployment rates), as
well as to the uctuations of wage and prot shares studied by Blanchard
1995b). The strength of discounting eects is then jointly determined by the width of
the inaction range, the speed of labor attrition, and the persistence of labor demand's
driving processes.
10
British data are also consistent with the evidence reviewed above and its dynamic-
labor-demand interpretation if the time series is split in two: before 1980, relatively
high (and rising) labour market regulation was associated with relatively stable un-
employment, at levels comparable to that obtaining in other European countries. In
the more recent period of reduced regulation and greater exibility, unemployment
rates are again on average comparable to those of other European nations but much
more volatile.
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(1997) and Caballero and Hammour (1998).
In fact, while the cyclical behavior of wages is muddled in all coun-
tries (see Figure 3), longer-run autonomous uctuations of wages are
predicted to interact with labor demand dynamics and turnover costs so
as to bias the wage share of labor upwards when wages increase and em-
ployment decreases, because the marginal product of labor is lower than
the wage in such contingencies; Caballero and Hammour (1998) embed
this insight in a matching model of the type surveyed by Mortensen and
Pissarides in this Handbook. The work reviewed in the next Section fo-
cuses on how specic institutional features of European labor markets
may be relevant to dynamic wage developments.
[ Figure 5]
3 Wage setting
Job security provisions can explain why, in certain countries and his-
torical periods, similar labor demand or wage shocks cause more or less
pronounced employment uctuations, and why the composition of un-
employment is biased towards young labor market entrants and long du-
rations. By themselves, however, ring costs cannot explain the equally
pronounced dierences in longer-term employment dynamics and unem-
ployment trends. When averaged over time, in fact, optimal dynamic
labor demand policies conform to the familiar downward-sloping rela-
tionship between wages and employment of static models. Microeco-
nomic interpretation of aggregate labor market outcomes must therefore
address wage determination issues. More specically, what is called for
are theoretical explanations of empirical associations between stricter
labor-market regulation on the one hand, and real-wage growth and un-
employment on the other.
In European labor markets, contracts signed by large unions and
employer confederations are often legally binding for all employment re-
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lationships in the sectors and periods concerned. Such institutional fea-
tures give aggregate relevance to the basic partial-equilibrium insight
that lower employment can be accepted by workers' representatives as a
byproduct of higher wages. The simplest among the partial-equilibrium
model of union wage bargaining reviewed by Farber (1986) studies how
a rational union should set the wage level that its employer counter-
part will take as given when choosing its prot-maximizing employment
and production levels. Whenever labor demand is downward-sloping, the
wage and the marginal productivity of labor are lower than its average
productivity; thus, like all monopolists, a wagesetting union will have in-
centives to capture part of such rents, while reducing their total amounts,
by choosing a higher wage. Formally, if the union is indierent to the
identity of its employed members the wagesetting problem is
max
w

wL(w) + (M   L(w))u

; (10)
where L(w) is the direct labor demand function, M is the labor force
represented by the union, and u is the benet ow (measured in the same
units as the wage) accruing to those among the workers represented who
end up not being employed by the rm considered.
The optimal wage choice is
w

= u; (11)
for  the mark-up ratio over the alternative income ow denoted by u:
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In this simple model of monopoly wage setting, the extent to which
the markup exceeds the unitary competitive benchmark depends on the
11
The alternative labor income to which the monopolistic union applies its mark-
up depends in obvious and important ways on such institutional features of regulated
labor markets as the generosity and coverage unemployment benets, as well as on
the character of unemployment experiences and other realistic features outside of this
chapter's narrow focus.
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(negative) slope of the marginal revenue product of labor, (), and of
its labor-demand inverse L(). In more complex and realistic models,
the wagesetting power of unions is not that of a pure monopolist, as
union members must contend with substitution possibilities and with
the bargaining power of employers. What follows reviews two relatively
subtle theoretical mechanisms through which union behavior may have
aggregate implications in European institutional contexts.
3.1 Insiders and outsiders
Figure 6 plots time series of total wage outlays for the same ve countries
considered by the previous Figures.
[ Figure 6]
The dynamics of employers' wage bills are certainly inuenced by
the wage-share uctuations mentioned at the end of Section 2, and their
trend growth since 1974 is noticeably slower in France and Italy than in
the other three countries. Still, the overall picture emerging from the Fig-
ure is suciently similar across countries which, as illustrated in Figure
1, experienced very dierent wage and employment dynamics. This is at
least supercially consistent with common technological long-run trends
across the ve economies considered, and with the idea that stronger
union bargaining power moved European countries towards higher wages
and lower employment along the near-unit-elastic labor demand sched-
ules implied by roughly Cobb-Douglas aggregate production functions. It
is somewhat more dicult, however, to explain why monopolistic wage-
setting practices should not only be more relevant to European labor
markets at any given moment in time, but also become more important
in each European country over time.
Since the rst two volumes of the Handbook were published, work
on \insider-outsider" models has addressed this issue by exploring the
dynamic implications of monopolistic wagesetting behavior. The basic
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modeling assumptions and insights of the dynamic models proposed by
Blanchard and Summers (1986), Gottfries and Horn (1987), and others
are simple. The size M of union membership appears in (10) and (15),
but only as a multiplicative constant with no impact on the optimal wage;
as in the standard union models reviewed by Farber (1986), the optimal
monopolistic wage depends only on the elasticity of labor demand and
on the outside option u, not on the size of the union's membership. To
let membership play a role in wage determination, however, one could
simply let its size M be smaller than the wage-bill-maximizing level of
employment: then, the alternative income u becomes irrelevant to all
union members and to wage determination, and the union should solve
the simple problem
max
w
wM s.t. L(w) M (13)
instead of (10). Recalling that N(w) is the inverse of the marginal prod-
uct schedule (), 13 has (corner) solution
w
I
(M) = (M;Z) : (14)
to protect its members' jobs while maximizing their income, the union
should choose the highest wage compatible with employment of its M
members and with Z; the exogenous determinant of labor demand.
12
Hence, a smaller union membership ceteris paribus implies a higher wage
rate.
A second crucial assumption of dynamic insider-outsider models is
that the wage rate be set before all the other determinants of employ-
12
Similar implications would follow from replacing the union objective function
(10), where all members of the union are equally likely to be employed, with one
where employment probabilities are heterogeneous across members. In the extreme
case where hires and layos are assumed to follow a precise order of seniority, each
worker would choose the highest wage consistent with his or her own employment,
and the contractual wage rate would depend on the precise voting rule adopted. See
Layard (1990) for a discussion of the long-run properties of such wage-determination
mechanisms.
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ment levels are known with certainty. Under standard \right-to-manage"
assumptions, rms are entitled to employ as many units of labor as is
ex post optimal for them given the wage rate set ex ante by a monopoly
union (or, more generally, bargained between the union and the em-
ployer). Exogenous uctuations of labor demand can then cause employ-
ment to uctuate while wages remain relatively stable.
13
The preset level
of wages, of course, should now take into account the fact that not all
of the union's members can be assured of continued employment. This
induces wage moderation, and lets the alternative income ow (denoted
u above) have a role in wage determination. As long as the job-nding
prospects of non-members are disregarded by the union's objective func-
tion, however, the outside factors indexed by u have an asymmetric eect
on wage determination. Outside factors only matter in the \bad news"
case where some of the union's members lose their jobs. Positive la-
bor demand shocks, conversely, do not benet union members, who are
certainly all employed if labor demand is higher than expected. In ex-
pected terms, accordingly, the overall weight of outside factors in wage
determination is smaller.
The third key assumption of models aimed at explaining the diver-
gent dynamics of wages and employment in Europe is an explicit link-
age between union membership and employment levels. As long as the
employed \insiders" have more of a say in wage determination than the
unemployed \outsiders," the asymmetric nature of the wage and employ-
ment process outlined above can explain endogenously why such labor
demand uctuations as might be generated by productivity shocks and
macroeconomic policies, though similar in the U.S. and Europe, had more
persistent wage and unemployment eects in the latter.
13
Right-to-manage contractual arrangements generally yield ex post Pareto-
inecient employment levels. Booth (1997) points out that when not only the wage,
but also redundancy payments are set ex ante then the right-to-manage employment
outcome can be brought closer to that of ecient bargaining by contractual ring
costs, and can coincide with it if the structure of uncertainty is suciently simple.
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These arguments rest on the assumption that wages are be set by
unions rather than by individual worker-employer bargains or by a com-
petitive market process. While monopolistic wage-bill maximization can
rationalize less than full employment, individuals workers who are not
employed ex-post have obvious incentives to try and underbid the con-
tracted wage unless part of the maximized wage bill is somehow trans-
ferred to them. If such atomistic underbidding were allowed, wage and
employment would of course unravel to the competitive solution (or to
binding lower bounds on wages deriving from unemployment benets
and other social transfers, or from minimum-wage laws). An impor-
tant source of union bargaining power, therefore, arises by closed-shop
contracts and, in the European context, by administrative extension to
all employment of contracts signed by sector-level unions, which simply
make it illegal for rms to employ workers at wages lower than the ex-
ante agreed oor; Section 4.2 discusses the implications of such limited
wage-bidding institutions in some more detail.
Insider-outsider models propose and study a variety of more subtle
features of labor market institutions and worker behavior which may iso-
late currently employed workers from underbidding by the unemployed
outsiders (see Lindbeck and Snower, 1988, and the review by Ball, 1990).
In the insider-outsider literature|recently surveyed in more detail by
Bean (1994) and Sanfey (1995)|formal models are often specied in
the essentially static terms of the simple derivations above, and an ex-
plicit optimizing analysis is rarely extended to a multi-period setting
(see Drazen and Gottfries, 1994). This makes it dicult to ascertain
the extent to which the phenomena described depend on the institu-
tional structure of the model and bear on long-run systematic eects;
further, the relatively robust results of insider-outsider models are not as
distinctive as might be desirable, and rely in turn on somewhat ad hoc
theoretical assumptions.
A basic implications of insider-outsider interactions in dynamic
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models is that insider power should be associated to persistent unem-
ployment and wage processes. As long as wages are predetermined or
otherwise insensitive to contemporaneous labor demand, however, la-
bor demand uctuations can have persistent eects in models that do
not specically focus on insider-outsider interactions. As Sanfey (1995)
points out, real wage rigidity can be generated by many other theo-
retical mechanisms (which may of course interact with insider-outsider
relationships, as in Gottfries, 1992). The simplest reason why employ-
ment and wages react sluggishly to each other could be the role played
by turnover costs in dynamic labor demand, along the lines of Section 2
above|though, as discussed in more detail at the beginning of Section 4
below, aggregate labor demand uctuations are not so pronounced as to
let turnover costs introduce the degree of persistence required to inter-
pret European labor market experiences. Qualitatively similar, but more
structural persistence mechanisms are proposed by Saint-Paul (1995a),
who studies a model where the \eciency" wage predetermined by em-
ployers is persistently endogenous to labor market conditions, and higher
when likely job loss makes imperfectly monitored workers reluctant to
supply eort. Unemployment persistence can also be explained by mod-
els where prolonged joblessness causes human capital depreciation and
involuntary unemployment results from loss of skills, rather than of union
membership status. The theoretical perspective of such models is in many
respects similar to that of the union-based ones reviewed here and in San-
fey (1995) and, like the latter, it is subject to theoretical qualications:
to the extent that skill loss is endogenous (or is taken into account by
endogenous wages), information asymmetries or other contractual imper-
fections are needed to explain unemployment persistence and inecient
use of labor (see Acemoglu, 1995 and his references).
Sanfey's (1995) critical review of the theoretical literature nds that
a common and robust implication of insider-outsider models pertains to
the weight of rm- or industry-specic factors in wage determination. As
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pointed out by Bean (1994), however, it is somewhat surprising to nd
that \inside" variables are most relevant in U.S. wage determination,
while they are least relevant in Nordic countries. For the purpose of
interpreting such evidence, theoretical models which explicitly consider
worker mobility costs and institutional wage compression across hetero-
geneous employment opportunities (reviewed in Section 4 below) may be
more relevant than a pure insider-bargaining perspective.
On the theoretical side, it is not a trivial task to specify and model
reasons why outsiders should be unwilling or unable to compete with
insiders. It is relatively easy to focus on contingencies where insider be-
havior intuitively keeps wages rigid in the face of negative labor demand
shocks, and prevents the resulting unemployment from being reabsorbed.
Modeling how insiders become entrenched and what prevents outsiders
from successfully bidding for employment, however, requires more atten-
tion to institutional detail and contractual imperfections.
Most immediately relevant to the present survey's train of thought
is the idea that ring costs may protect workers not only from job loss
due to exogenous labor demand uctuations, but also from replacement
by \outsiders" willing to work at less than the wage rate set by insid-
ers. Whenever it is costly for employers to replace expensive insider
employees with unemployed outsiders, any of the latter who are involun-
tarily unemployed should compete with the former by oering to work
at low wages. In a single-period model, the whole cost of replacing
insiders with outsiders|whether due to hiring costs or to job-security
provisions|drives a wedge between the two groups' contributions to the
rm's operating prots. In a dynamic version of such models, however,
outsiders could and should bid down the whole wage process (rather than
just a single-period wage), or even post a bond upfront so as to \buy"
themselves a job. If contractual arrangements make it possible to do
so, competitive pressure on equilibrium wage and employment patterns
should make turnover costs next to irrelevant in wage determination in
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a dynamic labor demand model with ongoing uctuations. As in Section
2 above, only the annuity vale of turnover costs should bear on average
employment and wages: higher turnover costs should be associated with
smoother employment dynamics, but have small and ambiguous average
eects.
14
Of course, realistic contractual imperfections are more likely to be
binding when turnover costs require dynamic contracting than in stan-
dard spot markets. Even when nancial market imperfections prevent
the outsiders from \buying" the insiders' jobs, however, insiders have in-
centives to preserve eciency and behave as discriminating monopolists
so as to capture rents from enlarged employment: insiders and outsiders
could in principle both benet from a ner dierentiation of wages and
employment opportunities than is allowed by the model outlined above
and by more detailed similar models in the literature (see Fehr, 1990).
The insight may indeed be relevant to recent institutional developments.
As Saint-Paul (1993,1996) points out, high unemployment due to strong
insider bargaining power may, from a politico-economic point of view,
rationalize labor market reforms based on temporary contracts and more
general restructuring of industrial relations on a two-tier basis.
3.2 Centralized bargaining
In the 1970s and 1980s, small \corporatist" countries such as Sweden
and Austria featured both a relatively low unemployment rate, and strin-
gent labor market regulations. As noted by Calmfors and Drill (1988),
what distinguishes these countries from both the unregulated U.S. and
14
Bertola (1990) develops this argument in some detail in the context of a persistent
Markov chain model similar to that outlined in section 2. Vetter and Andersen (1994)
make a similar point in a two-period model with hiring costs. Andersen and Vetter
(1995) show that outsiders have less of an incentive to underbid insiders if, as in their
overlapping-generations model of the labor market, insider status is age-related and
all young outsiders can look forward to insider rents in their old age.
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the highly regulated larger European countries is centralization of wage
bargaining. In a decentralized bargaining situation, unions take employ-
ment opportunities in other sectors as given but uncoordinated wage
demands by sector-level unions endowed with market power generally
lead to ineciently low levels of employment in the economy as a whole.
Conversely, when trade unions play the political role of \social partners"
they can be expected to take into account the eects of wage settlements
on all workers (indeed, all citizens) rather than only those of the subset
of workers who happen to be represented by sector-level unions in heavily
unionized countries with decentralized wage bargains.
To see this in a simple formal setting, let there exist (at least)
two rms with downward-sloping labor demand functions of the type
introduced above, and consider the optimal wagesetting policy for the
union attached to the rst of these rms: from
max
w

w
1
L
1
(w
1
) + (L  L
1
(w
1
))u
1
;

(15)
the optimal wage is
w

= 
1
u
1
(16)
for markup ratio 
1
which, as in equation 12 above, depends on the
elasticity of labor demand at rm 1. To highlight the qualitative role
of imperfect coordination across such wage setting choices, it suces to
suppose that the outside earning opportunity for potential employees of
rm 1, denoted u
1
, depends not only on an economy-wide alternative
income ow u, representing unemployment benets, utility from leisure,
or employment in a residual non-unionized sector, but also on the wage
set by a similar union operating in the other rm (or sector) indexed by
2. Suppose, in fact, that u
1
is a weighted average of w
2
and u as in
u
1
= ~pw
2
+ (1  ~p)u; (17)
where ~p indexes the likelihood that workers who are not employed by
rm 1 will be employed by rm 2. This parameter may be related to the
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probability p of labor-demand shocks discussed in the previous Section,
but also to the intensity of replacement hiring and to more general fea-
tures of the economic problem (discussed below). If the other sector's
wages are symmetrically set according to
w
2
= 
2
u
2
with u
2
= ~pw
1
+ (1   ~p)u; (18)
the resulting system of two equations in the two unknown wage levels is
readily solved to yield
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If a single union faced by the aggregate of the two rm's labor demand
functions were setting the same wage for all employees, it would choose
w = u for  =
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it might also be advantageous for the union to behave as a discriminating
monopolist and set dierent wages in the two sectors. Like the average
labor demand eects of turnover costs, the relative size of the markup
factors 
1
; 
2
, and  depends ambiguously on the functional form of labor
demand functions. But as long as ~p 6= 0 the multiplicative interaction
of the two unions' markup factors tends to raise uncoordinated wage de-
mands above (and reduce employment below) the level that would maxi-
mize the wage bill accruing to an economy-wide union's membership, and
a fortiori above the competitive market-clearing wages w
1
= w
2
= w = u
implied by the expressions above when 
1
= 
2
=  = 1. Hence, wages
are predicted to be lower (and employment higher) not only when they
are determined competitively but also when wage demands are coordi-
nated, relatively to situations where each union takes the other's wage
as a given component of its membership's alternative income ow and
wage demands are indeed ex post excessive even from the point of view
of employed workers as a whole.
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This theoretical insight is qualitatively valid in more general set-
tings, and its quantitative relevance depends on a variety of modeling
details. Spillovers across dierent rms' or sectors' wagesetting problems
can be modeled more realistically than in the simple model above, for
example taking into account the eect of wages on labor demand and
rehiring probabilities, or the eect of labor costs on the prices of work-
ers' consumption baskets (see Rasmussen, 1992, for a general-equilibrium
treatment of such interactions).
There is much obvious appeal in the idea that a centralized bar-
gaining process, by taking into account the welfare of all workers rather
than that of \insiders" only, should result in better employment per-
formances. At the empirical level, however, the theoretically appealing
notion of \centralized" bargaining is dicult to measure so precisely as
to obtain reliable statistical results. Soskice (1990) objects to Calmfors
and Drill's classication of various countries' labor market institutions,
and nds much less support for the basic theoretical insight in empirical
work that classies bargaining as decentralized in the Japanese and Swiss
labor markets, but centralized in the Dutch and German markets, and
acknowledges the changing pattern of wage determination in the British
labor market. From a more substantive point of view, increasing inte-
gration of good and product markets (as modeled by of Danthine and
Hunt, 1993) makes it dicult even in theory to dene relevant measures
of centralization or \corporatism;" and while nationwide coordination
may ease adjustment to largely aggregate shocks (such as the oil shocks
of the 1970s), recent developments may call for more exible wage and
employment responses across sectors. The OECD (1997) study fails to
nd evidence of a robust association between unemployment levels and
trends on the one hand, and updated corporatism indices on the other. A
much stronger association is evident between wagesetting centralization
and measures of earnings dispersion across workers. The next Section
discusses how this chapter's theoretical perspective may bear on ndings
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of more or less pronounced cross-sectional wage compression.
4 Idiosyncratic shocks and aggregate labor
markets
In the models above, employment was taken to be constant in the ab-
sence of labor demand uctuations. This made it possible to discuss the
latters' qualitative implications in the simplest possible setting, because
labor attrition (or \natural wastage" in British English) would neces-
sarily increase the dimensionality of the models' state space and their
analytic complexity. If labor attrition oered an alternative to costly
ring decisions, in fact, the models of the previous Section would fea-
ture not just two or three, but a continuum of employment levels: as
in Saint-Paul (1995b,1997a), employers would exploit quits to achieve at
least part of the employment reduction made optimal by labor-demand
shocks, and assuming that the latter follow simple Markovian models
would aord only limited simplicity.
Neglect of voluntary quits does have substantive implications, how-
ever. In fact, aggregate labor demand volatility cannot realistically call
for more than a few percentage points of employment reduction in all
but the worst recessions. Hence, even if job security provisions were so
tight as to make it impossible to terminate existing employment rela-
tionships rms' desired labor shedding could easily be accommodated,
in models which treat employment as a homogeneous aggregate variable,
by retirements and other demographic labor force transitions.
Within aggregate labor markets, however, sector- and rm-specic
shocks do entail much more intense \idiosyncratic" employment uctu-
ations than those observed at the aggregate level (see Davis and Halti-
wanger, 1992, and other recent work reviewed by their chapter in this
Handbook). By denition, rm-level job creation and destruction in ex-
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cess of what is required to achieve observed aggregate employment uc-
tuations does not bear directly on the level and dynamics of aggregate
employment. Both theoretical models and empirical evidence, however,
suggest that idiosyncratic phenomena play an important role in deter-
mining aggregate labor market outcomes over time and across countries.
The intensity of disaggregated job creation and destruction is an impor-
tant determinant of frictional unemployment in aggregate labor markets
when labor reallocation across sectors and jobs is a time-consuming ac-
tivity (see Lilien and Hall, 1986, and Mortensen and Pissarides's chapter
in this Handbook). Also, and closer to this chapter's train of thought,
idiosyncratic labor demand uctuations can hardly be accommodated by
voluntary quits if they are an order of magnitude larger than aggregate
ones: no labor attrition rate short of 100 percent could possibly make
job security and redundancy provisions irrelevant in the face of idiosyn-
cratic labor demand shocks so negative as to make it desirable for an
individual establishment to shut down. Hence, the desire on the part of
at least some rms to reduce employment by more than could be accom-
plished by simply not replacing quits is presumably the reason why ring
restrictions bind in reality, and the source of their smoothing eect on
aggregate employment dynamics.
4.1 Job turnover
The simple models of labor demand introduced in Section 2 are readily
adapted to the study of such issues. Instead of viewing the rm as repre-
sentative of all employment opportunities in an aggregate labor market
and the driving process Z as an index of aggregate shocks, consider the
opposite extreme case where labor demand uctuations are purely idio-
syncratic in a large cross-section of individual rms indexed by i. In
steady state, the cross-sectional distribution of exogenous forcing vari-
ables and endogenous employment levels coincides with the correspond-
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ing long-run distributions for an individual rm.
15
In the two-state model of Section 2.1.2, for example, half of the
rms would have the strong labor demand level indexed by Z
G
and em-
ployment l
G
, while Z
i
t
= Z
B
and l
i
t
= l
B
for the other half. In every
period, an exact fraction p of rms experience a change in productivity if
there are innitely many employers and Markov transition events are in-
dependent across them. Just because an equal cross-sectional frequency
of the two states corresponds to the ergodic probability distributions of a
(symmetric) Markov chain, the cross-sectional distribution remains sta-
ble over time: at the same time as p=2 rms suer a transition from high
to low productivity, p=2 other rms enjoy the opposite transition. Since
the (l
G
  l
B
)p=2 jobs created in every period balance job destruction ex-
actly, aggregate employment is stable, at a level given by the average of
high and low labor demand functions. As noted above, such averaging
may result in slightly lower or higher employment for any given wage
level, depending on functional forms and on the strength of discounting
eects;
16
but the sum of job creation and destruction divided by total
employment,
M
p(l
G
  l
B
)
l
G
+ l
B
; (21)
is much more strongly aected by the dynamic features of the rms'
15
The models could be extended to account for entry and exit of rms by allowing
exogenous uctuations of labor demand to be so large as to make zero employment
optimal in the worst states. Like individual and collective dismissals, plant closure
entails a variety of notication and compensation procedures in all countries. The
intensity of job turnover generated by plant closures is hard to evaluate empirically.
In the OECD (1994) data, roughly similar jobs turnover is associated to plant entry
and exit in countries with widely dierent labor market institutions. As argued in
Garibaldi et al. (1997), ownership changes and reclassication can easily generate
spurious establishment entry and exit in administrative data sources.
16
When labor demand uctuations are given a cross-sectional interpretation, em-
ployment and (frictional) unemployment levels also depend on the intensity of labor
reallocation if the latter is a time-consuming activity. For simplicity, however, such
issues are neglected in the present discussion.
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problem. This job turnover rate is easily computed from the optimality
conditions (7) of the simple two-state model if an explicit functional form
is specied for labor demand (; ): If labor demand is approximated by
the linear form (l; Z) = Z   l, for example, the gross turnover rate is
given by
M = p

Z
G
  Z
B
 
2p + r
1 + r
F

=

Z
G
+ Z
B
2
  w +
r
1 + r
F
2

(22)
when all rms pay the same wage rate w and follow the optimal labor
demand policy (7).
The extent to which rm-level employment respond to idiosyncratic
labor demand shocks is relevant at the aggregate level through its eects
on productivity and rms' prots. As noted above, turnover costs have
small and ambiguous eects on average employment and employers' wage
bills: they unambiguously imply that a larger steady-state proportion of
jobs has relatively low productivity, however, and therefore that aggre-
gate production (and rms' prots) should be lower when ring costs are
larger.
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) study the eect of ring costs on
labor supply and welfare in an otherwise standard competitive economy.
As in the partial-equilibrium setting of Section 2 above, the eects of
ring costs on labor demand at given wages generally depend on the ex-
act parameterization of tastes and technology. Dismissal costs, however,
have unambiguously negative eects on a representative agent's welfare.
These eects are large in Hopenhayn and Rogerson's calibrated econ-
omy, which also features lower equilibrium employment since lump-sum
rebates of separation taxes and the lower productivity and wage of labor
unambiguously reduce labor supply. As lower prots also reduce incen-
tives to save and invest, more stringent job-security provisions and lower
intensity of labor reallocation are predicted to reduce the steady-state
level of output, or the long-run rate of growth in an endogenous-growth
economy; Bertola (1994) studies these eects in a general-equilibriumver-
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sion of the two-state Markovian labor market of Section 2.1.2. Gordon
(1997) nds that, empirically, aggregate labor-supply (or wage-setting)
shocks induce short-run increases in measured productivity and slower
capital accumulation in \rigid" European countries. The more complex
model studied by Caballero and Hammour (1998) delivers similar impli-
cations, with an important role for surplus sharing rules in shaping the
incentives for capital-deepening investment.
4.2 Wage compression
The job turnover rate of an aggregate labor market may be measured
as the sum total of employment creation by rms (or plants) which are
expanding over a certain time span in a microeconomic data set, and
employment destruction by rms (or plants) which are contracting over
the same period. Perhaps surprisingly, available data on rm- or estab-
lishment level job turnover do not display the sharp dierences one might
expect in light of dierences in job security provisions (see Table 5.3);
Burgess (1994) similarly nds it dicult to detect a role for job security
legislation in determining the pace and intensity of intersectoral labor
reallocation.
Available data suer from many comparability problems, of course.
Most importantly, U.S. job turnover data may be downward biased by
the fact that small rms are underrepresented in the Census Bureau's
data; at the opposite end of the spectrum, a relatively large share of
employment is accounted for by small rms in Italy, where larger rms
appear to have more stable employment than in the United States.
[ Table 5.3]
[ Table 5.3]
[ Figure 7]
The similarity of job turnover data across countries with very dier-
ent institutions is remarkable, however, and equally remarkable is the ap-
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parent association of stringent job security provisions and narrow cross-
sectional wage dierentials. As shown in Table 5.3 and Figure 7, wages
are much more dispersed in the U.S. and the U.K. than in the other Eu-
ropean countries, and increasingly so through much of the period consid-
ered in Figure 1. Of course, such international comparisons are inuenced
by dierent degrees of labor force heterogeneity. The microeconomic ev-
idence oered by Blau and Kahn (1996) and by the papers in Freeman
and Katz (1995), however, suggests that wage inequality patterns are
similar when individual characteristics are controlled for, and that dif-
ferences in wagesetting institutions played a key role in preventing the
factors behind increasing U.S. wage inequality from aecting European
wage distributions.
From a theoretical point of view, it is indeed far from surprising that
relative wage variation should be heavily constrained in the same mar-
kets where job security provisions are most stringent. Quantitative ring
restrictions, in fact, could hardly be binding if wages were completely
unrestrained and employers could reduce them so as to make stable em-
ployment protable, or to induce voluntary quits. Limiting the freedom
oered to employers and workers in setting wages gives force to quantity
constraints, and the combined policies may be rationalized by \equal pay
for equal work" principles, or by the belief that freely contracting parties
may not be suciently rational or informed as to correctly evaluate the
ultimate consequences of arrangements that might appear optimal at a
particular moment. They may also, however, reect a desire by orga-
nized labor to enforce monopolistic wagesetting practices by preventing
underbidding by the unemployed. While ring costs cannot be expected
to reduce average employment at given wages, the combination of institu-
tional wage compression and job security provisions is a powerful source
of insider power, and their association in the data with high wages and
low employment is far from surprising.
From this chapter's perspective, it is also interesting to review
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briey how wage dierentiation may be related to dynamic labor de-
mand and supply (rather than to their static counterparts). To see how
labor demand uctuations and institutional features may bear on wage
dierentiation, consider the implications of worker mobility costs. If mo-
bility across rms is voluntary on the part of individual workers, it must
be the case that wages paid by the rms whose employment expands are
higher (or more likely to increase) than the wages paid by rms whose
employment contracts. In the context of the two-state example intro-
duced in Section 2 and given a cross-sectional interpretation in Section
4.1, rms with high labor demand should pay a wage w
G
higher than
that, denoted w
B
, paid by rms whose labor demand is currently de-
pressed. To characterize optimal mobility by risk-neutral workers who
aim at maximizing the present discounted value of their wage income net
of mobility costs, denoted W
G
and W
B
for workers employed by rms in
the two states, consider that the maximand satises the recursion
W
G
= w
G
+
1
1 + r
[(1  p)W
G
+ pW
B
] : (23)
for workers who are employed by rms with high labor demand, and have
no reason to move if mobility is costly; for workers employed by rms in
the worse state, the present discounted value of wages satises
W
B
= w
B
+
1
1 + r
[pW
G
+ (1  p)W
B
] (24)
if they choose to stay, and
W
B
= w
G
  +
1
1 + r
[(1   p)W
G
+ pW
B
] (25)
if they choose to move and the parameter  denotes mobility costs|
which will be taken as given in this chapter but, of course, are in general
endogenous to the labor market's institutional structure and economic
performance. Also for simplicity, the optimality (or no-arbitrage) con-
ditions above treat wages as given from the individual worker's point of
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view. More sophisticated and realistic models of labor mobility recognize
that mobility costs generally entail bilateral bargaining situations, and
address more complex issues of dynamic optimality (see the chapter by
Malcomson in this Handbook). The simpler assumption of wage-taking
behavior makes it possible to isolate the specic insights on which this
chapters focuses narrowly, and may be rationalized from rst principles if,
as in Lucas and Prescott (1976), each of the model's \rms" corresponds
to a sector with more than one competitive employer.
If mobility is voluntary and depressed rms have positive employ-
ment, then workers must be indierent between moving and remaining
employed by depressed rms, and (24) and (25) must simultaneously hold
true. Solving the linear system formed by (23-25) yields
W
G
 W
B
=  (26)
(in equilibrium, the mobility cost  equals the \capital gain" reecting
the expectation of higher labor income in the future), and
w
G
  w
B
= k  
1   2p
1 + r
(W
G
 W
B
): (27)
The wage dierential between good and bad rms is then given by
w
G
  w
B
=
2p + r
1 + r
  w
D
; (28)
and is positive if and only if  > 0.
This simple link between rm-level labor demand dynamics and
wage variability may be relevant to the evidence illustrated by Figure
7. The model's cross-sectional wage dispersion is a reection of time
series volatility of individual workers' labor earnings. While aggregate
wages are by an large unresponsive to labor demand uctuations in all
countries (as illustrated in Figure 3), relative wage dynamics at the level
of workers and rms is remarkably dierent across countries. Not only
the cross-sectional wage dispersion but also the innovation variance of
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individual wage proles has increased over the 1980s and 1990s in the
U.S., both for workers who stay in the same job and for those who change
jobs (Gottschalk and Mott, 1994). As argued by Bertola and Ichino
(1995a), the centralized bargaining institutions of European countries
discussed in Section 3.2 are peculiarly ill-suited to accommodate wage
dierentiation across workers who are ex-ante identical but happen to be
holding dierent jobs.
17
In cross-country evidence, rm-specic factors
in wage determination are relatively unimportant in European countries,
and receive almost no weight in Nordic countries (some relevant evidence
is collected by Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 1991, page 188 table 4.4).
This is surprising from the standpoint of at least some insider-outsider
models, but not from that of \local labor market" models that would
rationalize wage dierentials by labor mobility costs.
Further, Bertola and Rogerson (1997) suggest that wage compres-
sion may rationalize the extent of excess job creation and destruction in
European countries, which is surprisingly high (and quite comparable to
its American counterpart) in light of stringent job security provisions. If
labor demand is approximated by the linear form (l; Z) = Z   l, so as
to make explicit solutions available for the two employment levels, the
amount of gross turnover implied by rms' optimal labor policies is given
by a simple expression: if H = 0 and F  0 represents unit ring costs,
then
M (L
G
  L
B
)p
1
2
+ jL
B
  L
G
j p
1
2
=
p


(Z
G
  Z
B
)  w
D
 
2p + r
1 + r
F

:
(29)
A more compressed wage dierential w
D
|which need not satisfy (28) if
mobility is involuntary|increases desired hiring and ring at the same
17
Centralized bargaining may have allowed Sweden to avoid other European coun-
tries' high and rising unemployment levels, for the reasons suggested by Calmfors and
Drill (1988). Certainly, however, it led to extensive wage compression: between
1970 and 1982, the log variance of Swedish blue collar hourly wages fell from 0.036 to
0.015 (Hibbs and Locking, 1996).
40
time as a larger F reduces them.
When turnover data are measured on a worker (rather then rm)
basis, they do dier widely across countries, in the expected direction: in
Table 5.3, we see that unemployment inow and outow rates are much
higher in the US than in European countries.
[ Table 5.3]
The evidence on job duration (Table 4) is similarly unsurprising,
and indicates that European countries feature a larger percentage of sta-
ble jobs than the U.S. These ndings support a \dual" interpretation
of labor markets phenomena (Saint-Paul, 1997a; Boeri, 1997): even in
\rigid" labor markets where a core group of insiders jobs are very sta-
ble, many jobs are unstable and|like unemployment|instability falls
disproportionately on small portion of the labor force.
[ Table 4]
4.3 Aggregate turnover dynamics
Before reviewing recent work on such issues in Section 5 below, it will be
useful to discuss briey how the present theoretical perspective may be
brought to bear on time-series job turnover evidence. The \job turnover"
notion is most easily introduced with reference to a steady-state with
idiosyncratic uncertainty and, as mentioned above, has implications for
aggregate productivity in that theoretical situation. In reality, of course,
aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty coexist in all time periods: em-
ployment creation and destruction at the level of individual rms oset
each other to a large extent, but not completely, and aggregate employ-
ment is far from constant.
It is not dicult to see intuitively|but too complex to formalize in
this Chapter|that the coexistence of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks
tends to smooth out the impact of the latter in aggregate time series, to
an extent that depends on the responsiveness of employment to exoge-
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nous events at the rm level. The simple models of the previous Section
imply sudden switches from \high" to \low" employment levels (and no
job turnover in excess of that required to achieve aggregate employment
changes) if the Markovian labor demand shocks simultaneously hit all
(representative) rms in the market. As soon as labor demand forcing
processes are allowed to be less then perfectly correlated across rms,
however, then aggregate dynamics experience less drastic cyclical devel-
opments.
A particularly convenient class of models lets the probability (rather
than the size) of positive and negative shocks vary over the cycle: cycli-
cal upswings are then characterized by positive shocks hitting an unusu-
ally large fraction of an unusually large stock of rms with low labor
demand, while aggregate employment reductions symmetrically see neg-
ative shocks hitting many rms with unusually high employment levels.
In such settings, relatively smooth aggregate dynamics are the result of
exponential convergence of rm's cross-sectional frequencies towards the
steady state distribution implied by the current realization of aggregate
shocks (see Bertola and Caballero, 1990; Caballero and Engel, 1993; Ca-
ballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger, 1997, and other references therein; and
Gouge and King, 1997).
Recent empirical and theoretical work has documented and inter-
preted interesting patterns of covariation between gross and net job cre-
ation: in the U.S. data studied by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992, and
in this Handbook), excess job creation is countercyclical|i.e., aggregate
employment reduction is accomplished by a combination of relatively
weak job creation and relatively strong job destruction that is overall
more intense, in gross terms, than the cyclically weak job destruction
and strong job creation associated with aggregate employment growth.
It might be tempting to rationalize such ndings by exogenous uctu-
ations in the volatility of labor demand, as indexed by p in the simple
two-state model introduced above. It is not dicult to see, however,
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that asymmetric and time-varying probabilities for positive and negative
labor demand shocks would not necessarily result in cyclical variations
of job destruction and creation rates, because employers' labor demand
policies adjust endogenously so as to oset exogenous parameter changes:
in equation (21), a larger probability p of labor demand shocks would be
associated with more intense turnover if l
G
  l
B
could be kept constant;
but in light of (8) given turnover costs imply shallower employment uc-
tuations when labor demand is more unstable. Similarly, if ring workers
is costly and labor demand is more likely to fall than to increase, then
rms should position themselves so as to reduce employment by fewer
units if and when labor shedding is called for: see Caballero (1993) and
Campbell and Fisher (1996) for elaborations and qualications of this
point.
It is more insightful and appealing to use asymmetries in the cycli-
cal behavior of job creation and destruction as supporting evidence for
labor market matching frictions, of the type reviewed by Mortensen and
Pissarides in this Handbook, or other timing-related features of real-
life labor reallocation processes. While the simple model above took all
rm-level employment adjustment to be instantaneous, time-consuming
search implies slow job creation and fast job destruction, and wages bar-
gained under bilateral monopoly need not very so as to smooth out the
pattern of cyclical employment dynamics. The size and (especially) the
timing of hiring and ring operations is asymmetric in such settings.
During cyclical downturns, many jobs are destroyed at the same time
as (fewer) jobs are created, because depressed labor market conditions
reduce the opportunity cost of reallocation and reorganization activities,
in the models of Caballero and Hammour (1994). The cyclical behav-
ior of gross employment ows may also be rationalized from the worker
mobility cost perspective of Section 4.2. In the context of a model of
competitive labor reallocation similar to the one sketched in Section 4.2,
Gouge and King (1997) let labor demand uctuations be driven by an
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aggregate two-state Markov process as well as by a similar purely idio-
syncratic shock. If, as in Lucas and Prescott (1976), mobility costs reect
time spent in unemployment, then the lower opportunity cost of mobility
during recessions can rationalize the cyclical correlation of gross and net
employment creation.
From the present survey's point of view, it is interesting to note
that job turnover is not as countercyclical in European countries as in
the U.S., and may be even mildly procyclical. Garibaldi (1997) ratio-
nalizes ndings of acyclical labor turnover in European countries with a
model where institutional arrangements reduce the speed of labor shed-
ding. Boeri (1996) documents this and other empirical characteristics
of job turnover data for eight OECD countries, and discusses how sta-
tistical artifacts could be responsible for them (the coverage of the U.S.
employment survey, by excluding small rms, may overstate the amount
of job destruction in downturns). Measurement problems make assessing
the possible eects of institutional features on the degree of cyclicality
in labor turnover even more dicult than in the simple cross-sectional
perspective of Section 4.1.
5 On the determinants of institutions
The previous Sections argue, in the light of simple theoretical models,
that institutional dierences across otherwise similar labor markets are
at least qualitatively consistent with various pieces of empirical evidence.
Crucially, quantity and price rigidities are associated with each other
across countries: in labor markets where employed workers are protected
from dismissal by job security provisions and from outsiders' wage com-
petition by binding equal-wage constraints, wages tend to be higher and
employment lower (and more stable), while both unemployment and job
instability appear to be concentrated in relatively narrow subsets of the
labor force.
44
By taking institutional dierences as given, the reasoning above
begs the question of what might determine institutions in the rst place.
It may or may not be possible to answer such question by economic
theory alone, but economic interactions of the type outlined above are
certainly an important component of any meaningful answer. This nal
Section briey reviews theoretical mechanisms relevant to the issue at
hand.
5.1 The economics and politics of protection
The quantity and price rigidities entailed by legal regulation would make
little or no sense if ecient contingent contracts could be enforced in
perfect and complete intertemporal markets. In such circumstances, in
fact, any inecient regulation could and should be circumvented by pri-
vate contracts, along the lines of Lazear (1990). Reality, however, clearly
provides incomplete hedging opportunities against labor-income risk, and
both market incompleteness and institutional constraints make it dicult
for private parties to write and enforce contracts meant to work around
price and quantity rigidities. For obvious reasons of moral hazard and
adverse selection, it is dicult for individuals to shelter their consump-
tion pattern from idiosyncratic wage and employment uctuations by
pooling the relevant in nancial or insurance markets.
18
Labor market
regulations rule out employment and wages adjustment even when ne-
gotiation would be protable for individual workers and employers, and
the involvement of third-party agencies in many instances (ranging from
experience rating of U.S. unemployment contributions, to governmental
approval of employment reduction plans in Germany) makes it dicult
for individual employers and workers to write the side contracts that
would replicate laissez faire outcomes.
18
In the U.S., in fact, consumption inequality has increased roughly in parallel
with labor-income inequality, and poor people, in particular, appear to reduce their
consumption in response to decreased labor income (Cutler and Katz, 1992).
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Regulations themselves are hardly enforceable in relatively infor-
mal spot markets, and it is not surprising that \black" labor markets
should develop alongside heavily regulated primary sectors. But to the
extent that labor market regulation draws its eectiveness from realistic
contractual imperfections, and that governments and other super partes
coalitions may be better equipped than atomistic market agents to stipu-
late and enforce optimal risk-sharing contracts, labor market institutions
of the type considered in this Chapter might at least originally be meant
to obviate laissez-faire imperfections: insurance contracts against the
risk of unemployment may be impossible to enforce ex post unless the
scheme is mandatory and run by a government agency, and similar con-
siderations apply to the job security provisions and wage-compressing in-
stitutions considered here. Idiosyncratic labor demand risk and mobility
costs make it desirable for workers to receive compensation when made
redundant. While lump-sum payments to be paid in the event of job
termination can emerge from laissez-faire contractual arrangements (see,
e.g., Booth, 1996), they may not be ex post incentive compatible or en-
forceable in court unless they are part of a state-mandated scheme. And
the compression of cross-sectional wage dierentials resulting from cen-
tralized wagesetting institutions|which, as mentioned above, naturally
complements job security provisions|can be rationalized by workers'
risk aversion, i.e., by incompleteness of the asset markets where insur-
ance against idiosyncratic events should in principle be available (Agell
and Lommerud, 1992).
19
Institutional price and quantity rigidities do generally purport to
protect individuals against \unfair" adverse developments (at the cost
of some productive eciency). The extent and character of such pro-
19
The role of risk aversion is similar in this context and in that of \implicit contract"
models of wage and employment determination, surveyed by Parsons (1986). In con-
trast to that literature, however, rules and regulations pertaining to wage equalization
and job security are quite explicit.
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tection vary substantially across countries and over time, and may in
actual fact reect political-economic interactions between groups of self-
interested individuals rather than unanimous ex ante agreement. As
shown in Wright (1986), unemployment benets can be supported in
political-economic equilibrium even when complete markets exist: a pol-
icy package that transfers resources from the employed (or from the em-
ployers) to the unemployed is not only supported ex ante by risk-averse
individuals who are generally exposed to unemployment risk, but also
by individuals (such as those who are currently unemployed) who expect
the policy to transfer resources towards them as of the time voting takes
place.
Similar considerations may again be applied to other labor market
policies. The models reviewed in Section 3.1 study how such labor market
institutions as job security and unionized wage bargaining can inuence
wage and unemployment dynamics, and politico-economic models of la-
bor market institutions apply similar reasoning to the question of what
might in turn determine the character of an economy's labor market insti-
tutions themselves. Whenever labor market policies are chosen, median
voters are likely to be employed. Like union members who enjoy the
protection aorded by reverse-seniority layos and other forms of job se-
curity in models like Oswald's (1993), currently employed voters may aim
at high wages and employment stability rather than at high employment
and productive eciency. In the models proposed and solved by Saint-
Paul (1993,1996), majorities of employed insiders manipulate labor mar-
ket regulations disregarding the weaker unemployed outsiders' welfare,
and labor market regulation is essentially aimed at reducing competitive
pressure on the currently employed workers' wages and jobs. High unem-
ployment may often not reect \outsider" status in the strictest sense of
the world: the unemployed are a typically poorly organized minority in
the models proposed by Saint-Paul (1993,1996), but they do often sup-
port subsidies to their own income rather than the dismantling of those
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rigidities that make it impossible for them to succesfully bid for the in-
siders' jobs. An important clue to why such behavior may be rational is
oered by labor force participation rates, which are more clearly related
to labor market institutions than unemployment rates.
[ Table 5.3]
As shown in Table 5.3, in fact, prime-age male employment rates are
very high in all of the ve countries considered. Labor markets where
prime-age male labor income is strongly protected feature a markedly
\dual" structure, with higher youth unemployment and lower female em-
ployment than more exible ones. While these empirical features may
reect exogenous social attitudes and family structures, the observed
cross-country variation is arguably consistent with labor market insti-
tutions meant to protect primary wage earners from labor market risk
and|to the extent that gainers and loser from rigid institutions are mem-
bers of the same family|with their political stability over time.
5.2 Causes and consequences
While the \protective" character of labor market institutions and regu-
lations is similar in all industrialized countries, the stringency of job se-
curity and wage equalization policies is remarkably dierent across oth-
erwise similar industrialized economies. Within the politico-economic
framework outlined above, one might try and rationalize such institu-
tional heterogeneity by depicting European workers as intrinsically more
risk-averse than their American counterparts and/or more politically
powerful. Vague (and themselves unexplained) exogenous dierences can
hardly oer a satisfactory explanation, however; Bertola (1997) suggests
that nancial market imperfections could be brought to bear on the ef-
fective degree of risk aversion in labor market behavior.
A useful perspective on the relevant issues is oered by recent con-
tributions emphasizing interactions between various labor market insti-
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tutions and their eects. The terms of the eciency/security tradeo,
in fact, generally depend on the institutional status quo: if job security
provisions reduce hiring rates, for example, it is all the more desirable for
currently employed workers to seek protection from dismissal. In models
such as those proposed and solved by Hogan and Ragan (1995a,b), job
security|whether due to legislation or to partial-equilibrium contracts
between workers and rms|is more attractive when rehiring probabil-
ities are low, but also induces rms to refrain from hiring and ring
(e.g., by adjusting hours per employee rather than employment levels),
again establishing a positive feedback between the eects and desirabil-
ity of labor market rigidity. Such positive feedbacks from institutions
to their desirability are appealing, because they can rationalize widely
heterogeneous institutions and labor market outcomes in light of small
exogenous dierences in the history and political environment of indus-
trial countries|and, if reinforcing eects are so strong as to generate
multiple equilibria, even in the absence of any such dierence: Saint-
Paul (1995b) and Blanchard and Summers (1988) suggest that, since a
low quit rate makes ring costs a more important determinant of hir-
ing behavior and restrained hiring makes workers more reluctant to quit,
both high- and low-turnover equilibria may exist for given technological
and institutional parameters.
To the extent that dierent labor market policies and their eects
interact with each other in an important way, small dierences in ini-
tial conditions can lead to substantial divergence in outcomes, and the
varied institutional landscape of industrial countries may be rational-
ized without recourse to important exogenous dierences. Treating both
institutions and outcomes as endogenous variables, however, makes it
quite dicult to pinpoint and test the theory's causal implications. Em-
pirically, the interaction of institutions' economic eects with their own
political desirability makes it dicult to ascertain the direction of causal-
ity (see Saint Paul, 1996). In cross-country comparisons, unemployment
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duration outcomes are most strongly associated to labor market insti-
tutions and outcomes: countries with high job security and generous
unemployment benets feature a large proportion of long-term unem-
ployed, and relatively small ows into and out of unemployment. Models
which take labor-market rigidity as given explain market outcomes as
the endogenous result of optimizing choices by workers (who will not
search as hard when benets are high) and employers (who will not hire
and re as much when ring costs are high). The association of small
unemployment ows with institutional rigidities, however, can also be
read as support for a politico-economic interpretation: when the major-
ity currently employed workers face little risk of becoming unemployed,
there will be little support for policies aimed at improving the job-nding
prospects of the unemployed.
5.3 Transitions and reforms
Though most of the Chapter's theoretical arguments and cross-country
empirical comparisons, labor market institutions were not only conceptu-
ally taken as given, but also treated as invariant over time. While making
it easy to highlight the implications of dierent institutions in otherwise
similar dynamic environments, this perspective neglects important time-
series institutional developments: since the relative rigidity of European
labor markets largely emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s, many
dynamic features of cross-country labor market outcomes may be better
interpreted in terms of out-of-steady-state transitions|as in Saint-Paul
(1997b), Blanchard (1997), and Caballero and Hammour (1998)|rather
than from the long-run, steady state perspective of the simple models
outlined in Section 2. In more recent times, the British labor market has
undergone a exibility-oriented institutional transition. The conservative
governments of the 1980s tried and largely succeeded to eradicate unions
and labor market rigidities and|not surprisingly, from the comparative
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institutional perspective of the present Chapter|the British labor mar-
ket's performance is now similar to its American counterpart in many
respects (but not all, see Blanchower and Freeman, 1993).
Such evidence of institutional variability along the time-series di-
mension calls for economic and political studies of reform processes,
rather than of institutions at each point in time. As shown in Coe
and Snower (1997), various labor market policies strengthen each oth-
er's eects on the labor market's productive eciency, to imply that
comprehensive reforms should be preferred to marginal adjustments. In
a dynamic environment where expectations have an important role, the
timing and credibility of reforms is also important. Saint-Paul (1997a)
notes that the employment benets of a permanent transition to two-tier
labor market are front loaded: as employers take advantage of new. more
exible hiring opportunities at the same time as they still hoard protected
employees, employment increases during the transition to the new steady
state. Symmetrically, Bertola and Ichino (1995) discuss how uncertain
prospects of durable reform may undermine positive labor market de-
velopments: those among the employers that nd it optimal to reduce
employment will do that when job security provisions are relaxed, but
aggregate employment may decline if other employers refrain from hiring
for fear of future reinstatement of ring costs.
This nal Section has only too briey sketched how labor market
regulation may be modeled as the endogenous result of political and eco-
nomic interactions, and the analysis of reform processes is a promising
direction for further research. Like earlier modeling eorts focused on the
eects of exogenously given institutions, normative and positive analyses
of endogenous institution formation and evolution will likely be moti-
vated and inspired by empirical observations. In fact, many of the simple
cross-country stylized facts cited in the Chapter as motivating and cor-
roborating evidence for theoretical work and insights are becoming less
useful pegs for further theoretical work, as recent wage and employment
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dynamics in many European countries are more similar to their U.S.
counterparts than to their own behavior in previous periods. The theo-
retical insights outlined in the Chapter may prove valuable as European
countries undertake reforms of their poorly performing labor markets.
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Figure 1: Total employment and real total compensation per employee.
1970=100 in the country-specic panels; German raw data are plotted as
a dotted line, and spliced at the time of reunication for comparability.
In the last panel, European wage and employment data are normalized
by the U.S. observation in the same year. Source: OECD Economic
Outlook database.
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Figure 2: Total employment as a fraction of population 15-64; real total
compensation per employee, in the major industrial countries. 1970=100
in the country-specic panels. In the last panel, European wage and
employment data are normalized by the U.S. observation in the same
year. Source: OECD Economic Outlook database.
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Figure 3: Total employment and real total compensation per employee,
1970=100, deviations from country-specic moving averages; German
data are spliced at the time of reunication for comparability. Source:
OECD Economic Outlook database.
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Figure 4: The eects of turnover costs
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Figure 5: Unemployment rate (percentage points) and real total com-
pensation per employee (1970=10). Source: OECD Economic Outlook
database.
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Figure 6: Log of real total compensation per employee times total em-
ployment, 1970=100 indexes. Source: OECD Economic Outlook data-
base.
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Figure 7: Male earnings inequality. Country data are displayed (from
left to right) in order of increasing labor market exibility. See the Table
for denitions and source.
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Tot Cont Entry/Exit
Italy (1984-92) 23.4 15.7 7.7
Germany (1983-90) 16.5 12.1 4.4
France (1984-92) 27.1 12.9 14.2
United Kingdom (1985-91) 15.3 8.7 6.6
United States (1984-91) 23.4 18.9 5.7
Table 1: Job turnover: percentages of employment, annual averages; the
second and third column refer to continuing establishments and to enter-
ing/exiting establishments, respectively. Establishments are legal entities
(rms) for Canada, Italy, and the United Kingdom, organizational units
(plants) in the other countries. Source: OECD Employment Outlook
(1994).
1986 D5/D1 D9/D5
Italy 1.44 1.53
Germany 1.43 1.66
France 1.61 2.10
U.K. 1.66 1.73
U.S. 2.07 1.87
1994 (or...) D5/D1 D9/D5
Italy (1993) 1.60 1.65
Germany(1993) 1.37 1.64
France 1.61 2.13
U.K. 1.74 1.86
U.S. 2.13 2.01
Table 2: Summary indicators of male earnings inequality (decile ratios).
The columns report the ratio of the upper limit of the 5th decile to the
upper limit of the 1st decile, and of upper limit of the 9th decile to the
upper limit of the 1st decile. Larger gures indicate more inequality.
Source: OECD (Employment Outlook 1996, table 3.1).
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Unemployment Unemployment Long-term
inows (a) outows (a) unemployment (b)
1988 1988 1983 1993
Italy 0.18 2.3 57.7 58.2
Germany 0.26 6.3 39.3 33.5
France 0.33 5.7 42.4 34.2
United Kingdom 0.68 9.5 47.0 35.4
United States 1.98 45.7 13.3 11.7
Table 3: Unemployment ows, a: average monthly ows as a percentage
of source population; b: percentage of total unemployment. Source:
OECD Employment Outlook (1990, 1994).
Tenure on current job
< one year, > ten years, average,
% of jobs % of jobs all jobs
Italy 8.5 45.6 11.6
Germany 16.1 35.4 9.7
France 15.0 42.0 10.7
United Kingdom 19.6 26.7 7.8
United States 28.8 6.7
Table 4: Completed duration of jobs in existence, 1995. Source: Eurostat
total Males aged 25-54
Italy 52.6 84.2
Germany 63.1 88.2
France 57.6 87.3
United Kingdom 67.5 84.8
United States 71.7 87.3
Table 5: Employment rates, 1990-96 average; source: OECD Employ-
ment Outlook database.
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